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INTRODUCTION
Censorship used to be a very dull subject. Aligned along
predictable and venerable divisions separating liberals from
conservatives, oriented toward ancient and well-rehearsed
chestnuts such as obscenity and national security, the topic
promised little of analytic interest.
In recent years, however, the landscape of censorship has
altered dramatically. Now feminists in Indianapolis join with
fundamentalist Christians to seek the regulation of pornography.
Critical race theorists join with Jesse Helms to regulate hate
speech. Advocates of abortion rights seek to restrict political
demonstrations while conservative pro-life groups defend the
freedom to picket (p. 1).
So begins Robert Post's introduction to Censorship and
Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation, a collection of essays by
scholars "from divergent disciplinary perspectives, ranging from political
science to philosophy, from law to cultural theory, from literary criticism
to anthropology" (p. 5).' With characteristic acuity, Post has isolated two
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1. In addition to the introduction, the essays discussed in this review include the following: Rae
Langton, Subordination, Silence, and Pornography's Authority; Frederick Schauer, The Ontology of
Censorship; Sanford Levinson, The Tutelary State: "Censorship," "Silencing," and the "Practices of
Cultural Regulation"; Leslie Green, Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing; Lawrence
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interesting aspects of the contemporary debate about censorship and si-
lencing. The first is the fracturing of old political coalitions and the crea-
tion of strange new alliances, such as the one between feminists and
fundamentalist Christians. Jack Balkin has explained this development
through his theory of "ideological drift," which posits that because
"alliances between particular conceptions of rights and a particular
political agenda are always contextual," we should not be surprised when
historically liberal principles "drift" to serve conservative interests (or vice
versa).2 The second and more puzzling development is the proliferation of
different conceptions of censorship, such as the extension of the concept of
censorship beyond obscenity to hate speech. For if adherents of "free
speech" can support the regulation of pornography or hate speech, it is in
large part because they construe pornography and hate speech themselves
to be inhibitors of "free speech."3 This, of course, is a very different con-
ception of censorship from the classical one, under which the regulation of
pornography and hate speech, but not pornography and hate speech them-
selves, would qualify as censorship.4 What is the explanation for this pro-
liferation?
In his brief essay, Post begins to answer this riddle before gesturing
toward the other essays in the collection, which provide further clues to the
riddle's resolution. Post explains our changing views of censorship by
looking to our changing conceptions of the censoring subject. He suggests
that the old order had a monolithic view of the state as the only censoring
subject (p. 1). This view led to the "very dull" alignment of censorship
along predictable lines: state against individual, conservative against lib-
eral (p. 1).
According to Post, this conventional wisdom came under attack due
in significant part to insights gained from Michel Foucault's work on
power (p. 1).5 Put crudely, Foucault's view is that power never resides un-
problematically in a subject, but is rather diffused across relationships in a
Douglas, Policing the Past: Holocaust Denial and the Law;, Ruth Gavison, Incitement and the Limits
of Law; Judith Butler, Ruled Out: Vocabularies of the Censor Richard Burt, (Un)Censoring in
Detail: The Fetish of Censorship in the Early Modem Past and the Postmodern Present.
2. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DuKE L.J. 375, 383.
3. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 16 (1996) (describing silencing effects
of pornography and hate speech).
4. See id. at 2 (noting that classical conception of censorship viewed state as sole threat to free
speech).
5. As Post explicitly recognizes, insights gleaned from Foucault are clearly not the only impetus
behind the proliferation of censorship models. Indeed, I believe that even his references to Foucault can
be read as placeholders for a broader skepticism (in both constitutional advocacy and postmodern
theory) about the primacy of state power.
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minute and shifting array.6 When censorship is seen through this lens, it
may no longer be viewed as the special prerogative of the state (pp. 1-2).
This corroborates our intuition that many non-state entities censor. Yet as
Post points out, this diffuse conception of censorship-under which cen-
sorship does not emanate from any individual subject but rather from per-
vasive social norms-is also problematic (p. 4). It makes the
commonsensical conception of censorship as a transaction between sub-
jects ("X censors Y') unintelligible (pp. 2, 4). Indeed, it rescues us from the
idea that the state is the sole censoring subject only by positing that no en-
tity is a censoring subject. Post registers the need for a view of the censor-
ing subject that is neither as sentimental as the old statist conception nor as
skeptical as the Foucaultian conception (p. 4). He explains the current
polyphony of views about censorship as arising out of the indeterminacy of
this middle ground (p. 5).
Post's account of changing conceptions of the censoring subject is
powerful. I wish to supplement it, however, with an analogous account of
changing conceptions of censoring speech. For just as there are sentimental
and skeptical conceptions of the censoring subject, so too are there senti-
mental and skeptical conceptions of censoring speech. Under the senti-
mental conception of censoring speech, only certain kinds of words have
the power to silence others. Rae Langton's essay in this collection de-
scribes these explicit commandments of censorship, such as "I forbid you
to speak," or "I threaten you with sanctions if you speak" (p. 261). The
skeptical conception of speech, which could also be characterized as
Foucaultian, criticizes the claim that only explicit orders or threats can
foreclose speech. As Frederick Schauer's essay explains, it maintains that
the most potent forms of censorship are not even experienced as speech,
but as a set of background conditions of intelligibility, such as the rules of
grammar or syntax (p. 147). Foucaultian acid can thus dissolve speech into
norms just as easily as it can dissolve the subject into norms. Yet in so
doing, it will again be experienced by some as going too far. Thus there is
a need for a conception of censoring speech that is neither as sentimental
as the old explicit conception, nor as skeptical as the Foucaultian concep-
tion. Only under such an account can we intelligibly recuperate the con-
ception that speech can censor even if it does not do so explicitly.
Langton's essay notes that pornography, for example, is said to silence
women by barring their speech from being heard and understood, despite
the fact that it does not explicitly forbid them to speak (pp. 274-75). It is,
moreover, understood as discrete speech rather than as a diffuse set of con-
ventions that govern speech (pp. 261-62).
6. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, 78, 92-108 (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al.
trans., The Harvester Press 1980).
20001 1637
HeinOnline  -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1637 2000
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
As I will repeatedly use the words "sentimental" and "skeptical" to
describe homologous views about both subjects and speech, I explicitly
define these terms here.7 By "sentimental," I mean the tendency to attribute
more power to an object than that object actually possesses. Here those
objects are either subjects or speeches. In contrast, by "skeptical," I mean
the tendency to treat any statement about an object's power as naive. The
danger of the sentimental view is the error of synecdoche. Synecdoche is a
literary device through which parts are substituted for wholes, or wholes
for parts-as when one says "seven sails" to denote seven ships.8 The sen-
timental view engages in synecdoche because it ascribes the power to cen-
sor to a subset of the entities that actually possess that power, making the
part stand in for the whole. Thus, it takes the subset of all censoring sub-
jects that is the state, or the subset of all censoring speeches that is the ex-
plicit prohibition, and imbues it (and only it) with the power to censor.
Conversely, the danger of the skeptical view is the error of dissipation. The
skeptical view leads to dissipation in its suspicion that power is always
elsewhere, always more minute and fine-grained than the agent proposed
as the candidate for power. Under this conception, power is spread so
thinly across society that no discrete agent can ever be held accountable for
censorship.
In Part I of this review, I elaborate on the parallel stories that can be
told about changing conceptions of subjects and speech: stories of error
(the classical model's sentimental conception), overcorrection (the
Foucaultian model's skeptical conception), and equilibration (the contem-
porary model's comprehensive conception). I argue that despite
postmodern encouragement to view all censorship as arising from norms,
the contemporary model has retained a partially sentimental conception
(which could also be called a partially skeptical conception) of both sub-
jects and speech as discrete agents of censorship. I call the contemporary
model the "eclectic" model of censorship, drawing on the historical use of
that word to denominate the class of philosophers who adopted whatever
philosophical doctrines pleased them without much attention to the dis-
tinctions between the schools from which the doctrines emanated? The
contemporary model is eclectic in its embrace of the classical model, the
Foucaultian model, and other models of censorship without regard to the
tensions between them. I wish to argue that while the eclectic model there-
fore risks incoherence, it also powerfully captures the way many of us
think about censorship today. I demonstrate this in Part II by
diagramming the eclectic model more formally as a censorship matrix that
7. I appropriate these terms from Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law,
49 STAN. L. REv. 1149, 1151 (1997), where they are used in a related, but not identical, sense.
8. See 17 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 478 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED].
9. See 5 id., at 56.
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contains nine different models of censorship. I briefly discuss each of these
models, drawing where possible on the collection for my examples. By so
doing, I hope to show that the practice we call "censorship" actually de-
nominates a family of very different sub-practices which it is useful-
however incoherently-to disaggregate.
I
OF SUBJECTS AND SPEECH
Conventional wisdom would probably cast the censoring subject as
the main agent of censorship and censoring speech as a mere instrument in
the hands of that agent. This intuition justifies Post's focus on the censor-
ing subject. However, I wish to suggest that censoring speech, far from
being a simple tool of the censoring subject, may be viewed as a co-equal
agent in the practice of censorship. In making this contention, I begin with
the more circumstantial claim that the censoring subject and censoring
speech have had parallel conceptual histories. I then make the more ana-
lytic claim that our understanding of censorship would be incomplete
without taking both subjects and speech into account.
A. Sentimental and Skeptical Conceptions of Subjects
Post argues that censorship theory has traveled through three concep-
tions of the censoring subject (pp. 1-5), which might be described as a tra-
jectory through error (the sentimental conception), overcorrection (the
skeptical conception), and equilibration (the eclectic conception). In the
first phase, censorship is assumed to proceed only from the state (p. 1).
This sentimental conception is our current juridical one, as our First
Amendment jurisprudence protects individuals only against state censor-
ship. Under this conception, Post views censorship as "very dull" because
the binary of censorship/speech tracks the familiar binaries of
state/individual and right/left.
Tedium is not the only fault of the sentimental conception. It is also
problematic, according to Langton, because it presumes that if the state
does not censor, the individual is free to speak (pp. 261-62). Yet individu-
als can clearly be impeded from speaking, even without the intervention of
the state, in at least two ways. First, private actors can censor. As Schauer
notes, "If during the first session of a class I point out the silliness of some
student's comments, I can be confident I will not hear again from that
student for the remainder of the course" (p. 152). Call this private censor-
ship. Second, social norms that cannot be traced to any single actor
(whether public or private) can censor. As Schauer also observes,
"censorship may come from discourse itself, as when forms of discourse
discourage people from speaking, or when the rules of discourse make
certain utterances impossible" (p. 147). The existence of such censorship
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means that "[t]o be for or against censorship as such is to assume a
freedom no one has. Censorship is" (p. 2). 1 Call this pervasive censorship.
To the extent that it seeks to protect the autonomy of individuals to speak,
the classical model's failure to take private and pervasive censorship into
consideration is troubling.
These two objections to the sentimental conception of the subject are
clearly very different: private censorship is much less radical an extension
of the sentimental model than pervasive censorship. This is because private
censorship, like public censorship, assumes a discrete censoring subject.
All that is required to include private censorship in the old model is a more
expansive notion of censoring subjects. In contrast, pervasive censorship
does not seek to expand the set of censoring subjects, but rather to expose
the very idea of the censoring subject as naive. Put differently, both public
and private censorship are forms of what might be called "discrete" cen-
sorship and, as such, they stand in contrast to pervasive censorship.
It is pervasive censorship's radical objection to discrete censorship
that inaugurated the second phase of censorship theory. Post assigns much
of the responsibility for this shift to the work of Michel Foucault (p. 1).
Foucault observed that the state has no monopoly on power, exhorting us
to "eschew the model of Leviathan in the study of power."'" Indeed,
Foucault averred that while the state's more spectacular exercises of power
draw our eye, real power lies elsewhere. 2 Such micropower-the power of
discourse or norms-is not concentrated in any given subject, but rather
diffused through a "capillary" action across every quotidian social
activity: 3 "Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared,
something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised
from innumerable points .... "I4 Such power is likely to remain invisible
because it is so shifting and minute that it is unlikely to be experienced as
an exercise of power. Yet it is more, rather than less, powerful for that.
Thus, in general, no state commandment requires that men observe
the grooming code that tacitly forbids them to wear dresses. In truth, it
would be difficult for one to point to any actor as the source of that com-
mandment. Nor do men, from one day to the next, experience their adher-
ence to the code as an exercise of power. Yet neither of these facts means
that power has not been wielded. Indeed, both might suggest the opposite.
The fact that one cannot trace the command back to a source means that
one cannot appeal to that source to alter it. As Michael Walzer notes,
10. Post is quoting Michael Holquist, Corrupt Originals: The Paradox of Censorship, 109
PMLA 14, 17 (1994).
11. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 102.
12. See id. at 94-97.
13. See id. at 96.
14. MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 94 (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon
Books 1978).
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"[t]here can't be a seizure of power if there is nothing at the centre to
seize.""5 And the fact that men do not experience the decision not to wear a
dress as a decision means that they will not have occasion to reflect and
choose otherwise.
Has the state then no power? One wishes to ask if a Foucaultian
would say the state had no real power if it were sentencing him to death.
Yet the Foucaultian has an answer to this. He would argue that to the ex-
tent that the state has real power, it is micropower. In other words, the
power of the state is not immanent within the state, but rather arises from a
set of norms that give the state, and not some other entity, this force. Thus,
when the judge sentences the convict, her power relies on the micropower
that keeps her authority intact. Norms make the bailiff take the prisoner
away; norms make the warden turn the key; norms prevent the public from
rioting in the streets and freeing the prisoner. The fact that the state has this
force, then, should not be taken as evidence that there are some forms of
power that are not based in micropower. Instead, what keeps that spec-
tacular exercise of power in place is precisely a web of hidden and minute
exercises of micropower. The "state still exists, more or less, but it merely
conceals the actual procedures of power, the mechanisms of disciplinary
coercion, which operate beyond the effective reach of the law."16
To this point, I have been summarizing the Foucaultian position at the
level of abstraction at which Foucault framed it-that is, as a general the-
ory about power and subjects. The application of this general theory to the
specific case of censorship, however, should be intuitive. The spectacular
form of power in this instance is the act of state censorship. The
Foucaultian critique is that the real exercise of the censoring power occurs
at a much more diffuse level. To extend my earlier example, men will find
their speech as well as their grooming affected by gender norms. This is
perhaps most evident in languages that require gender-differentiated
speech, such that to speak a language not appropriate to one's gender is
tantamount to speaking that language ungrammatically.'7 To one negotiat-
ing in such a language, the source of the commandment to speak in gender-
appropriate ways is always obscure. Moreover, the act of compliance is not
seen, except in rare moments, as an accession to power.
The allure of the Foucaultian model of censorship is that it punctures
the illusion that the state has a monopoly on censorship. When grammar is
recognized as a form of censorship, it becomes clear that some forms of
censorship are beyond the will of the most efficient mortal sovereign. "I
15. Michael Walzer, The Politics of Michel Foucault, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER 51, 55
(David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986).
16. Id. at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. See, e.g., PETER MOHLHAOSLER & RON HARRI, PRONOUNS AND PEOPLE: THE LINGUISTIC
CONSTRUCrION OF SOCIAL AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 70 (1990) (describing such languages).
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am afraid we are not rid of God," Nietzsche once said, "because we still
have faith in grammar." 8 With that insight comes the concomitant notion
that individuals do not have full agency to speak simply because they are
protected from state censorship. Indeed, it leads inexorably to the belief
that individuals can never have such complete agency, as they are never
free from censorship.
The problem with the second phase of censorship theory, however, is
that it overcorrects for the error of the first. Rigorous adherence to
Foucault's conception of micropower captures the conception of pervasive
censorship, but only by rejecting conceptions of discrete censorship.
Foucault's work insists that we be skeptical of labeling anything as the
agent of power, suggesting that the moment of saying "X censors Y' is a
naive moment. Power is always elsewhere: "It is never localized here or
there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or
piece of wealth."' 9 The acid of Foucaultian skepticism dissolves the con-
cept of the state as a sole censoring subject only by dissolving the concept
of anything as a censoring subject.
Post points out that the Foucaultian move seems to scant "something
of importance featured in more traditional accounts"-namely, public cen-
sorship (p. 4). He suggests, for example, that this conception denigrates the
state-imposed martyrdom of dissident writers and poets: "The new
scholarly orientation toward censorship seems blind.., to the 'high drama
of repression and suppression' retold by Zamir Niazi in his effort to
'preserve... for posterity' the courage of Pakistani writers resisting the
oppression of a tyrannical regime" (p. 4).20 Post could also have pointed
out that the Foucaultian conception ignores forms of private censorship
that do not figure even in the traditional account. Catharine MacKinnon's
activism against pornography, for example, finds no basis in a conven-
tional statist model, as pornography is produced by private actors.2' Nor
does it find a basis in a Foucaultian model, as it attempts to hold individual
producers of pornography accountable.22
18. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 483 (Walter
Kaufmann ed. & trans., Viking Press 1968).
19. FOUCAULT, supra note 6, at 98.
20. Post is quoting ZAMIR NIAZi, THE WEB OF CENSORSHIP XV, Xviii (1994).
21. See, e.g., American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-28 (7th Cir. 1985)
(striking down anti-pornography ordinance drafted by MacKinnon and others as enshrining state
orthodoxy about women, thereby implying that pornography itself is not such a state orthodoxy). This
is not to say, of course, that the statist model could not be enlarged to encompass pornography. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 10 (1993) (suggesting that conception of censorship be
enlarged to include powerful private individuals silencing powerless individuals and "hiding behind
state power to do it").
22. The ordinance at issue in Hudnut provided a civil cause of action against the makers and
sellers of pornography. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325.
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We are thus driven onward to a third phase of censorship the-
ory: equilibration between the first two models. In this phase, we reject the
sentimental conception of the sovereign subject as monolithic censor that
animated the traditional model. Yet we also reject the skeptical conception
of all subjects that leads to their erasure in the Foucaultian model. This
partially sentimental model acknowledges the force of norms, but still re-
tains the view that it is meaningful to speak of discrete subjects of censor-
ship. It is a middle ground that covers all ground: censorship is seen to
emanate from public actors, private actors, and from norms. For this rea-
son, I call this an eclectic conception of the subject.
The danger of this conception is a potential for incoherence. To cling
to the conception of discrete subjects of power after acknowledging the
power of pervasive norms seems to risk contradiction. Can we recuperate a
meaningful censoring subject that can withstand Foucault's acid sophisti-
cation? Some have sought to answer this question normatively, by sug-
gesting that Foucaultian sophistication is not incompatible with the agency
of discrete actors.' 3 I wish to approach the question somewhat differently,
relying not on theoretical grounds but on pragmatic ones. I suggest that one
test of a theory's merit is how well it is perceived to fit empirical facts.
Foucaultian skepticism does not do well under this test. The marked per-
sistence of sentimental conceptions of the subject even in the wake of the
Foucaultian revolution implies that the theory fails to resonate with lived
experience?4 Even Foucault himself was unable to eschew such sentimen-
tal conceptions of the subject in his interviews on politicsO While we live
in an age of skepticism about the subject, nothing is more notable than our
inability to carry that skepticism to its limits, that is, our inability entirely
to relinquish a sentimental conception of the subject. Unless it is our
equally sentimental attitude toward speech.
B. Sentimental and Skeptical Conceptions of Speech
A parallel account of error, overcorrection, and equilibration can be
told about the conceptions of censoring speech. Just as the sentimental
conception of the subject holds that only a special kind of actor-the
state-can be a censoring subject, so too does the sentimental conception
23. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION (1997).
24. Of course, a Foucaultian might respond that the persistence of the sentimental view is merely
the persistence of false consciousness. The longevity of the sentimental view, he might say, arises not
from a failure in the theory, but from a failure in the mind that cannot internalize that theory. This
response is impossible to overcome on its own terms, as any counterargument will be seen as further
evidence of the criticized false consciousness. To concede that the Foucaultian response is
unfalsiflable, however, is not to concede that it is true.
25. See Walzer, supra note 15, at 60 (suggesting that Foucault, in his interviews on politics, often
engaged in advocacy of large-scale reforms that conflicted with his views on micropower).
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of speech hold that only a special kind of speech-the explicit prohibi-
tion-can constitute censoring speech.
To see this, note that under the classical (and juridical) model, not all
speeches that are made, even by the state, are considered censorious. Only
explicit state pronouncements that forbid the speech of private individu-
als-such as sedition acts, hate speech codes, and anti-pornography ordi-
nances-are so viewed. Sanford Levinson's essay concerns other instances
of state suppression, as when the state drowns out the speech of other ac-
tors through its own affirmative speech, which are not so classified (pp.
195-96).
J.L. Austin's theory of speech acts, which makes numerous appear-
ances in Censorship and Silencing, 6 is useful in making the distinction
between different forms of censorious utterances. In his canonical work,
How To Do Things with Words,27 Austin concerns himself with a category
of speech he calls "performative"-speech that creates, rather than merely
describing, the thing it names.28 Austin further refines this category of
speech into "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" utterances to distinguish
between two different senses in which words can "do" things.29 Illocution-
ary speech is speech that does something in the very act of utterance. 0 Fa-
mous examples include "I thee wed," "I christen thee," "I give you," or "I
bet you," in which the marriage, the christening, the gift, or the bet are not
being described, but rather called into being, by the utterance.3 Perlocu-
tionary speech, in contrast, is speech that does something as a consequence
of the utterance.32 "Ready, aim, fire," would be a particularly clear exam-
ple, but such instances should not obscure the fact that most speech has
perlocutionary effects. Indeed, speech commonly denominated as illocu-
tionary will also have perlocutionary effects. Thus, when I say "I promise,"
the utterance has the illocutionary effect of promising, but may also have
the perlocutionary effect of reassuring its hearer.33 Under the sentimental
model, only the illocutionary utterances of censorship-for example, "I
order you to be silent," or "I threaten you with sanctions if you speak"-
are deemed censorious. The perlocutionary utterances of censorship are not
so denominated.
Like the sentimental conception of the subject, this sentimental con-
ception of speech suffers from two problems. The first is that
26. For example, see the references in the Green, Langton, Levinson, and Schauer essays.
27. J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.0. Urmson & Marina SbisA eds., 2d ed.
1975).
28. Id. at 6-7.
29. Id. at 94-107.
30. See id. at 99-100.
31. See id. at 5-6 (adducing these examples as instances of "performative" speech).
32. See id. at 99-100.
33. See id. at 109-10.
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perlocutionary utterances can have the effect of suppressing speech, as
when one actor's speech "drowns out" the speech of another. This can oc-
cur whether the speaker is the state or a private actor. The derogation of a
particular viewpoint in a public school curriculum would be an example of
perlocutionary silencing by the state. And Schauer's example of a profes-
sor silencing a student by humiliating him (p.152) would be an example of
perlocutionary silencing by a private individual.
More subtly, speech may have the perlocutionary effect not of pre-
cluding others from speaking, but of preventing their speech from being
understood. Rae Langton's essay in this collection suggests that even as-
suming that pornography does not prevent a woman from saying "No" to
the sexual advances of men, it may prevent her "No" from being heard as a
refusal (pp. 2 74 -75 ). Langton gives the following example, drawn from
Donald Davidson's work, of how speech may be disabled in this way: "An
actor has a role in which he shouts, 'Fire! I mean it! Look at the smoke!';
but then a real fire breaks out in the theater, and he shouts, 'Fire! I mean it!
Look at the smoke!"' (p. 274).11 In this instance, the actor is not prohibited
from shouting "Fire!" but his utterance is misunderstood as a line in a play
as opposed to a warning in real life. His "Fire!" in Austin's terms,
"misfires" as a communicative gesture. 6 Langton then builds the analogy
to pornography, suggesting that pornography puts women in a play where
their "No" is taken to be a fictive rather than an actual refusal. When a
woman is placed in a position where she wishes to refuse a sexual advance,
she is "like the actor who says 'Fire,' intending to warn, and using the right
words, but failing to warn" (p. 275). In technical terms, then, pornography
has the perlocutionary effect of what Langton terms "illocutionary
disablement" (p. 274). Even if not itself an illocutionary utterance, pornog-
raphy may have the consequence (the perlocutionary effect) of silencing
other forms of speech. Specifically, it may have the ability to prevent the
illocutionary speech of others (such as "I refuse your sexual advance," or,
more plainly, "No") from being efficacious. llocutionary disablement is
this forced misfire of speech.
The second problem with the sentimental conception of speech is that
many kinds of censorship do not take the form of discrete speech at all.
The rules of intelligibility, such as grammar or vocabulary, might again be
such an example. As noted earlier, such diffuse rules of discourse may be
seen as a censoring force that contrasts with discrete subjects.37 Here we
see that such discourse can also be seen as a force that contrasts with
34. In her essay, Langton summarizes an argument she makes more fully in Rae Langton, Speech
Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. Aim. 293, 293-330 (1993).
35. The hypothetical of the scripted fire appears in DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH
AND INTERPRETATION 269 (1990).
36. See AUSTIN, supra note 27, at 16.
37. See supra notes 10-25 and accompanying text.
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discrete speech. Discourse, then, has the impressive quality of being the
opposite of both discrete subjects and discrete speech; it is a site where
subjects and speech dissolve and merge.
Again, it is the second, more radical objection that embodies the
Foucaultian critique. The objection notes that we ascribe power to discrete
speech, the spectacular agent of power, when really the power is held by
the norms that underlie speech. In other words, while we might sentimen-
tally believe that the illocutionary utterance "I thee wed," enacts the wed-
ding rather than describing it, this is not entirely true. If it were, I should be
able to get married whenever I said "I thee wed," in the same way that God
produces light whenever he says "Let there be light! 38 But I clearly do not
have this power, for mere utterance of the words will not result in marriage
if addressed to someone already married, or to someone of my own sex, or
before someone not ordained to perform the ceremony. This suggests that
the real power of illocutionary words must inhere in a set of underlying
norms. Just as micropower is the real source of power for the spectacular
subject of the state, so too does micropower guarantee the spectacular
speech of illocution.
This point can be assimilated into an Austinian framework. Austin
noted that no performative utterance could be efficacious unless a set of
underlying "felicity conditions" were satisfied.39 The first of Austin's six
felicity conditions posits that: "There must exist an accepted conventional
procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include
the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances. '
In the case of the marriage, the conventional procedure is the marriage
ceremony, which produces the marriage by requiring the uttering of certain
words (for example, "I thee wed") by certain persons (for example, two
unmarried persons of opposite sexes who are over-age), in certain circum-
stances (for example, before someone ordained to perform the ceremony).
To adapt this Foucaultian critique to the case of censorship is a simple
matter. Leslie Green's essay responds to Langton's contentions about illo-
cutionary disablement by deploying such a critique. After quoting
Austin's first felicity condition (p. 299), Green criticizes "[t]he idea of
silencing through illocutionary disablement" for resting "on the very
general and convention-independent thesis that one is silenced whenever
one's words fail to be taken with the force one intends" (p. 302). Green
thus suggests that Langton is proposing that a woman's "No!" should be
like God's "Let there be light!" calling the refusal into being independently
of background conventions. He then asserts that because no speech has
38. See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 13
(1993).
39. AUSTIN, supra note 27, at 14.
40. Id.
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meaning outside of a set of background conventions, no one can assume
the right to have her speech be efficacious in this way.41 Green observes
that it is ludicrous to state that silencing has occurred simply because the
felicity condition that would enable the speech does not exist in the
speaker's culture, giving the example of someone who claims that he is
silenced because he cannot engage in talaq divorce in the United States
merely by thrice uttering the phrase "I divorce you" (p. 300).
The response to the Foucaultian critique is again that it goes too
far: dissolving all speech into norms does not adequately describe in-
stances in which discrete speech seems to censor. In responding to Green's
comments, Langton criticizes his characterization of pornography as a kind
of silencing that proceeds through diffuse norms. She notes that Green sees
only two alternatives. One is narrow silencing (which is similar to my con-
ception of sentimental censorship) in which "(a) you fail to speak at
all; (b) you fail because someone else stops you" (p. 276). Both Langton
and Green agree that such silencing can be troubling. The other is broad
silencing (which tracks my conception of skeptical censorship) in which
"(a) you speak, but fail to be heard as you intend; (b) you fail because
there is no universal guarantee that you will be heard as you intend" (p.
276). Both Langton and Green agree that broad silencing is generally un-
problematic. But Langton admonishes Green for not seeing another alter-
native: "(a) you speak, but fail to be heard as you intend; (b) you fail
because some[one] else stops you" (p. 276). In other words, she argues that
assuming that anything that is not an explicit prohibition is reducible to
prohibition by a norm elides the circumstance in which specific perlocu-
tions can disable speech.
It thus appears that we find ourselves in the context of speech, as in
the context of the subject, in a strange middle ground that covers all
ground. In this middle ground we adopt an eclectic conception of speech
that acknowledges the power of illocutionary censorship, perlocutionary
censorship, and pervasive censorship.
if
THE CENSORSHIP MATRIX
My homologous accounts of censoring subjects and speech might im-
ply that I believe these are parallel concepts that never meet. Because this
is far from my view, I hasten to synthesize the two variables. By deploying
the distinctions made above, I first create a formal taxonomy of the various
forms of censorship. I then use the essays in the collection to elucidate
some of the categories in the taxonomy. I note, however, that some forms
41. Langton responds that it was never her position that human beings should have tile power to
secure uptake of any illocution, but rather that there are particular illocutions that are so important that
they must be protected against interference (pp. 275-76).
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of censorship suggested by my taxonomy are not addressed even in this
urbane collection. I therefore generate my own examples of such forms of
censorship.
I have now distinguished between sentimental and skeptical concep-
tions of subjects and speech, and the intermediate ground between them. I
have identified three potential subjects of censorship: public subjects,
private subjects, and norms. I call the first two discrete, and the third
pervasive. Similarly, I have identified three potential kinds of censoring
speech: illocutionary censoring speech, perlocutionary censoring speech,
and norms. I call the first two kinds of speech discrete, and the third
pervasive.
When these distinctions are used together, they suggest a taxonomy of
censorship. The taxonomy might be arrayed as follows, with subjects on





illocutionary Anti- Editorial Prohibitions of
Censoring Pornography Decision by Four-letter






(Discrete) (I) (m) (VI)
Perlocutionary State Education, Pornography, Elision of Third-
Censoring Monuments Hate Speech, Gender Pronoun
Speech
Levinson Langton
(Discrete) (IV) (V) (VII)
Norm Pronouncements Elision of Rules of
of the Acad6mie Words by Grammar,
Franqaise Dictionaries Vocabulary
Butler
(Pervasive) (VII) (IX) (11)
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The matrix thus shows that there is not only one model of censorship
(as the classical juridical model might suggest), or two models of censor-
ship (as the Foucaultian critique of the classical model might suggest), but
at least nine models of censorship. I have numbered these models to track
the story of error, overcorrection, and equilibration described above. Under
that account, the classical model represented in Cell (I) is attacked by the
Foucaultian model represented in Cell (II). These two poles imply an in-
termediate ground, represented by Cells (III), (IV), and (V). Perhaps be-
cause these models of censorship simply extend the classical model to
other discrete subjects (private actors) and other discrete speech
(perlocutionary speeches), they are fairly intuitive, and therefore well rep-
resented in this collection. But the matrix also suggests other permuta-
tions: Cells (VI), (VII), (VIII), and (IX). These permutations are perhaps
less intuitive because they involve the interaction of discrete agents and
norms, which are often considered to be antithetical categories. These
models of censorship are less well represented in this collection, and I seek
to speculate about their nature here. The remainder of this discussion will
travel through the cells in the enumerated order, considering how the col-
lection represents, or does not represent, each particular cell.
Cell (I) is illocutionary censorship by a public actor. This cell is the
only one containing practices that the classical model of censorship con-
sistently deems constitutionally impermissible. Under this model, anti-hate
speech ordinances and anti-pornography ordinances will be struck down as
state action inhibiting "free speech."'42 The silencing effects of pornogra-
phy and hate speech themselves will not fall under this model, both be-
cause they are private and perlocutionary in nature. The criticisms of this
model are by now well-rehearsed, and the collection as a whole embraces a
more plural conception of censorship.
To say that the collection recognizes many other forms of censorship,
however, is not to say that all of the essays argue unequivocally against the
classical model. In their contributions, Lawrence Douglas and Ruth
Gavison express concerns about departures other legal systems have made
from the classical model. Douglas considers laws prohibiting
Holocaust denial that have been promulgated in a variety of Western de-
mocracies. He argues against the legal regulation of Holocaust denial be-
cause the purpose of such regulation is the preservation of history, which
he believes the law is not institutionally competent to perform (pp. 83-84).
Gavison examines Israeli debates about legal curbs on private speech that
followed the assassination of Itzhak Rabin, a murder thought to have been
42. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that St. Paul ordinance
regulating hate speech violated First Amendment); American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that Indianapolis ordinance regulating pornography violated First
Amendment).
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incited by speech. While she believes that Israeli incitement laws should
remain on the books for the present, she also believes that such restrictions
on speech are often "ineffective and counterproductive" (pp. 60-61). Crid-
cal commentary thus not only departs from the classical model, but con-
sistently returns to it.
Diametrically opposed to the classical model, both spatially and con-
ceptually, is Cell (II), or the Foucaultian model of censorship. This model
involves neither discrete actors nor discrete speech. Such censorship in-
cludes the rules of grammar or vocabulary, in which the conditions of in-
telligibility are set forth without attribution to any specific actor. In asking
us to consider the formidable force of this kind of censorship, Judith
Butler's essay argues that classical censorship may be in some ways easier
to overcome than pervasive censorship (pp. 247-59). Butler points out
that explicit state interdictions are prone to self-contradiction insofar as
they generate speech about X by saying "don't say X." She gives the mili-
tary's "don't ask, don't tell" policy as an example of such a self-defeating
interdiction, arguing that the restrictions on speaking about homosexuality
within the military actually "proliferated such references not only in its
own supporting documentation but also in the public debates fostered on
the issue" (p. 250). The paradox that one must sometimes speak the un-
speakable to keep it unspeakable ensures that, to a certain extent, explicit
censorship will be self-defeating.
Unlike such explicit interdictions, pervasive censorship need not
name what it seeks to restrain. This is because such censorship functions
"on a level that is prior to speech-namely, as the constituting norm by
which the speakable is differentiated from the unspeakable" (p. 255).
While the classical model takes speech as (if only imaginatively) pre-
existing the act of censorship, Butler's model suggests that speech can only
be produced through an act of censorship that precedes the speech itself.
Such censorship does not risk self-contradiction because it need not ar-
ticulate the prohibited speech to foreclose it. Indeed, Butler argues that
such censorship is undefeatable, as it is the pre-condition for meaningful
speech.
The poles described by Cells (I) and (II) imply a middle ground. The
extremes of public actors and norms suggest the intermediate term of pri-
vate actors, just as the extremes of illocutionary speech and norms suggest
the intermediate term of perlocutionary speech. Adding these intermediate
terms to our matrix limns three other permutations of censorship involving
both discrete actors and discrete speech.
Cell (ll) is illocutionary silencing by a private actor. This form of
censorship is identical to the classical model in being illocutionary in na-
ture. It differs from classical censorship only in that the censoring subject
is private rather than public. Schauer gives the examples of "the decision
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of a newspaper editor (or television network) to 'spike' what a reporter has
written, or the decision of the organizers of a political debate to exclude a
so-called fringe candidate, or the decision of a curator to exclude a work of
art from a museum .... ." (p. 151). In all these instances, the censoring
actor is saying "Thou shalt not speak," but the interdiction is constitution-
ally permissible because it emanates from a private actor. Schauer sug-
gests, however, that the social reality of these practices may sometimes be
the same as state-sponsored acts of censorship (p. 151). Is there such a dif-
ference between a legislature that bans Mapplethorpe and a gallery that
does so? (pp. 151-52). If so, does that difference neatly track the pub-
lic/private distinction, or is some other distinction, such as institutional
competence/incompetence in play? (p. 162). Schauer is led by such ques-
tions to the conclusion that the term "censorship" has no ontology, that
there is no definition of censorship (such as state-sponsored, illocutionary
silencing) that remains constant over context (p. 164).
Cell (IV), or perlocutionary silencing by a public actor, is the obverse
of Cell (III). This form of censorship is identical to the classical model in
emanating from a public actor. It differs from the classical model in being
framed in perlocutionary rather than in illocutionary terms. Levinson ad-
duces the instances of the state inculcating lessons through public educa-
tion (p. 198), or honoring certain people but not others through street
names (p. 199) or stamps (p. 212-13). Such state speech clearly makes it
harder or impossible for others to express counter-visions of reality or es-
teem (p. 196). But because the state is foreclosing those other visions not
by burning the offending book with its illocutionary speech but by drown-
ing it out with its perlocutionary speech, this form of silencing is constitu-
tionally permissible. Levinson critiques this illocutionary/perlocutionary
distinction in the way that Schauer problematizes the public/private dis-
tinction. Levinson suggests that
[t]he danger of 'silencing' those who disagree with the state's
views comes, most often, not from any plausible fear of classic
censorship-the overt punishment for offering views repugnant to
state authorities-but, rather, from being 'drowned out' in the
marketplace by the superior resources often available to the state
(p.196).43
Taking the example of public monuments, Levinson demonstrates that the
harms of such state perlocutions can be analogous to state illocutions, as
when the state's maintenance of a monument to white supremacy is
experienced as "drowning out" anti-racist speech by placing the state's
imprimatur on racism (pp. 204-11).
43. Levinson does not specify whether he believes state perlocutions are more threatening than
state illocutions per se, or whether state perlocutions are more threatening than state illocutions because
the law provides fewer protections from the former than it does from the latter.
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Cell (V) is perlocutionary censorship by a private actor, exemplified
by pornography or hate speech. Pornography is not promulgated by public
actors, but by private ones. Moreover, the silencing effects of pornography
are not illocutionary, but perlocutionary. Most opponents of pornography
are not arguing that one opens a pornographic magazine to find the
words-"women are forbidden to speak." Rather, they aver that the por-
nography need not make this interdiction of speech explicit in order to ef-
fectuate it. Unlike Cells (III) or (IV), this model is thus twice removed
from the classical model of censorship. Langton implicitly acknowledges
this by replicating the moves made by Schauer and Levinson. Like
Schauer, she seeks to problematize the public/private distinction, consid-
ering the ways in which private actors, like public actors, can have
"jurisdiction" over other private actors (p. 264). Langton notes that just as
the "private" Catholic church may have state-like power over its adherents
(and non-adherents), so too might pornographers have such a power over
pornography's consumers (and non-consumers) (pp. 264-73). Similarly,
like Levinson, she questions the illocution/perlocution distinction. Langton
opines that even assuming that pornography is itself not an illocution, it
has the perlocutionary effect of disabling the speech of women
(pp. 273-77).
The collection, then, fills out our matrix nicely, suggesting that there
are not one, or two, models of censorship, but rather five. Yet even this
more robust account of censorship leaves some cells at the margins of the
matrix undertheorized. Cells (VI)-(IX) can be grouped together as the most
speculative forms of censorship, which seem to go largely unanalyzed even
in this sophisticated anthology.
Cell (VI) is illocutionary censorship through a norm. By this, I mean
an explicit prohibition on certain kinds of speech that cannot be said to
originate in a state or private actor. An example of such censorship might
be prohibitions on four-letter words. Obviously, there are instances in
which we can trace this prohibition to state actors, as in anti-swearing or-
dinances,"4 or to private actors, as in more quotidian injunctions laid down
by parents, teachers, or peers. But to speak of any of these actors as
originating the prohibition seems wrong, as the taboo seems much more
diffuse. Thus, while the injunction is discrete in form ("Thou shalt not say
x"), it is pervasive in origin-it is a censoring illocution produced by a
norm.
Cell (VII) is perlocutionary censorship through a norm. Here the pro-
hibition is not framed as a direct prohibition, but rather as an affirmation
that indirectly forecloses other forms of speech. Yet this locution is also
not traceable to any particular public or private actor. The convention of
using "he" and "she" as mutually exclusive and cumulatively exhaustive
44. See ASHLEY MONTAGU, THE ANATOMY OF SWEARING 158 (1967).
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singular pronouns for human beings might be such a form of censorship.
Unlike the taboo against four-letter words, the interdiction is not a direct
one in the form of "Thou shalt not say x," where x would represent some
alternative other than "he" or "she." In the case of four-letter words, the x
in this formulation is intelligible--everyone knows the word that is being
suppressed. In the case of a third-gender pronoun, no widely known word
is being forbidden. Rather, the seeming sufficiency of "he" and "she" has
the perlocutionary effect of rendering such an alternative largely unimag-
inable.
With Cell (VIII), we shift to the confluence of discrete actors and per-
vasive speech. This cell represents public actors who alter the norms sur-
rounding speech. While public education might be the most obvious
example of such regulation, the Acad6mie Frangaise might provide a more
vivid one. The Acad6mie, which Cardinal Richelieu made an official
French institution in 1635,41 seeks "to labor with due care and diligence to
provide certain rules to [the French] language, and to render it pure,
eloquent, and capable of treating the arts and sciences. 46 As such, it is a
public institution seeking to engage directly with the norms of discourse
itself. The Acad6mie's longstanding war against "franglais," for example,
is less well understood as an objection to particular words like "Euroland"
than as a defense of the "linguistic purity" of French discourse.47
Finally, Cell (IX) represents the attempt by private actors to change
the norms of language. An easy example would be the English-language
dictionaries that serve the same function as the Acad6mie Frangaise in de-
termining the metes and bounds of standard English. Our expectation that
such dictionaries will serve this function can be seen in the response to a
decision made by the compilers of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary. In 1961, the compilers stated that the project of the dictionary
would shift from the prescriptive one of distinguishing correct from incor-
rect usage to the descriptive one of simply reporting developments in the
language.48 This decision caused a furore among many intellectuals, who
believed "that the turn to 'descriptive linguistics' represented a
fundamental betrayal of the normative duty of lexicographers."49 This re-
sponse implies that while these dictionaries are created by private entities,
they nonetheless exercise influence on the conditions of discursive
intelligibility.
45. See JEAN-POL CAPUT, L'ACADtMIE FRANgAISE 7 (1986).
46. Maurice Druon, Preface to DICTIONNAIRE DE L'ACADMIE FRANgAISE I (9th ed. 1992)
(quoting Statutes and Rules of Acaddmie Franqaise, 1635) (my translation).
47. John-Thor Dahlburg, Euro Currency Earns a Wealth of Linguistic Controversy, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1999, at A2.
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Travelling through the matrix demonstrates that there are at least nine
different practices that could be called censorship. Even this array is not
meant to be exhaustive, as there are forms of censorship that do not fit
comfortably within any single cell. Richard Burt's contribution, for exam-
ple, contends that censorship in the early modem English theater was a
collaborative enterprise between public subjects (the court censor) and pri-
vate ones (the playhouse bookkeeper, scribe, or dramatist) (pp. 17-41).
Nonetheless, the matrix amply demonstrates that the practice of
"censorship" is not one but many practices, among which cogent distinc-
tions can be made. While, as Schauer says, censorship has no ontology
(p. 164), it may be that it has ontologies.
CONCLUSION
I started with Post's conundrum-how are we to explain the prolif-
eration of categories of censorship? Developing on Post's answer, I sug-
gested that this proliferation could be explained by a parallel shift in
conceptions of subjects and speech. We began with the sentimental classi-
cal model, which only recognized state illocutions as censorship. We then
moved to the skeptical Foucaultian model, which refused to recognize
anything but norms as the agents of censorship. Finally, we equilibrated
back to an eclectic conception of both subjects and speech. That phase of
equilibration led us to recognize many more forms of speech as censorship.
But to answer Post's question is to pose others. Is this phase of equili-
bration internally coherent? More specifically, can we drink from the
Foucaultian well and still validly maintain the eclectic conception? After
all, the Foucaultian account provides a complete story about censorship,
which casts adherence to any other account of censorship as a form of false
consciousness. We might thus ask if the eclectic model is sufficiently
rigorous.
The answer to the last question depends on what is meant by rigor. If
by rigor we mean philosophical coherence, the answer is probably a nega-
tive one. By definition, eclecticism draws on many disparate, and even
contradictory, philosophical traditions. On the other hand, if by rigor we
mean a sedulous descriptive accuracy, the answer is more likely to be af-
firmative. The eclectic model more accurately captures a lived and legal
experience in which discrete actors and speeches are felt to have the power
to censor. It also more accurately describes a lived and legal experience in
which censorship can be driven by norms so pervasive as not to be per-
ceived as censorship.
It may well be that these two forms of rigor are not simultaneously
attainable. We may need to trade off some philosophical coherence to
describe a complex social phenomenon like censorship with precision.
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Necessary or not, this is the bargain that the eclectic model of censorship
has struck.
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